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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
RAMONA HAYWARD,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

vs.

No. 8525

LEO GEORGE EASTMAN,
Defendant and
Respondent.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CA'SE
This appeal arises out of an action brought
by the plaintiff and appellant Ramona Hayward
against the defendant and respondent Leo George
Eastman to recover for injuries and damages allegedly sustained by the plaintiff in an automobilepedestrian accident which occurred on the LarkHerriman road on the 26th day of November, 1953
in Salt Lake County, Utah. Two fundamental questions are raised by the appeal:
l
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1. Was the verdict of the jury justified by
the evidence?
2. Were the issues in the case properly submitted to the jury?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff is the wife of Fred Hayward (R.
111). At the time of the accident they were living
in Riverton, Utah (R. 112). The plaintiff and her
family had been invited to the home of Faye and
Francis Osborne for Thanksgiving, and on the afternoon of November 25, 1953 at about 4 :00 o'clock
P.M. the plaintiff went to the Osborne hor.ae to help
Mrs. Osborne get ready for Thanksgiving the next
day (R. 112). She and Mrs. Osborne sat around
drinking coffee, talking and making pie crust (R.
112). A little after 5:00 o'clock P.M. Mr. Osborne
arrived home from work (R. 113). Mr. Osborne had
something to eat and then left to go to the store
(R. 175-176). At about 7:00 o'clock P.M. a Ralph
Crane (whose last name, coincidentally, is the same
as plaintiff's first husband's name, Chester Crane,
but who, according to the plaintiff, is no relation)
arrived (R. 113, 155, 158). He had been drinking
and was drunk at the time he arrived (R. 113, 146).
Mr. Francis Osborne returned from the store
about 8:30 or 9:00 o'clock P.M. Ralph Crane had
brought a fifth of whiskey with him (R. 193). The
group remained at the Osborne home eating sand2
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

wiches ( R. 235) and drinking coffee, beer and
whiskey. During that time the plaintiff admits having had one can of beer ; Francis Osborne had one
drink with Ralph Crane and a can of beer; Ralph
Crane drank part of the whiskey (R. 147, 176,
303) . Mrs. Osborne was unable to drink anything
because she had a sore throat (R. 235).
At about 10:30 P.M. the group left the Osborne
home and went to Viv and Arch's (a tavern in
Riverton) to get a pack of cigarettes for Mrs. Osborne (R. 113). Mr. Crane brought the fifth of
whiskey along and the plaintiff had a drink out
of that bottle prior to entering Viv and Arch's
(R. 146, 147). The group remained at Viv & Arch's
until about 11:30 P.M., during which time more
beer and whiskey were consumed (R. 148, 149, 227,
298, 308). The group left Viv & Arch's with the
intent of going for a ride (R. 236). Ralph Crane
and Francis Osborne got in the back of the car and
the plaintiff and Mrs. Osborne sat in the front of
the car, Mrs. Osborne doing the driving (R. 177).
Mrs. Osborne drove down Redwood Road to
West Jordan and then decided to drive to Lark,
Utah to see her friend, Gertrude Oliver, whose
husband had recently passed away (R. 236, 240).
When they arrived at Lark they went by the Oliver
house but the lights were out so they drove down
through Lark and started on their way home (R.
3
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236) on the road between Lark and Herriman, Utah.

j

As they were driving down through a canyon (R. ;
237) Mrs. Osborne told the plaintiff that she had
to go to the bathroom and asked her if she would
go with her, to which the plaintiff agreed. Where-:1
upon Mrs. Osborne slowed down and stopped the :,J
car (R. 237). Mrs. Osborne does not recall what
happened after that (R. 237).
•.i

:;!.

The area in which Mrs. Osborne stopped the ::1:
automobile and the area in which the accident occurred is illustrated by two diagrams (Exhibits
32 and 28). The road in this area is a rather narrow two lane hard surface road (see Exhibits 33,
31 and 32) running in a generally easterly and
westerly direction. At the west end of the area about
600 feet from the place where the accident occurred
as the crow flies the road make a rather sharp turn
to the southeast from a northeasterly direction and
then proceeds on around 400 feet where it makes a
gradual turn back to the east (Exhibit 28). The
point of impact was located near a telephone pole, ~~
the witnesses for the plaintiff testifying that the .
point of impact was 30 feet west of the telephone
pole and the police officers and the defendant's
witnesses testifying that the point of impact was
30 feet east of the telephone pole. Exhibit 32, which
is a diagram drawn to scale, illustrates that the
shoulder of the road west of the telephone pole is
4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4.

2.) - .:;.::

Looking W. from point 1 00' E. of pole (with white placard)
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150' W. Of pole.

quite wide, while the shoulder east of the telephone
pole is very narrow and was estimated by the police
officer to be 4 feet wide (Exhibit 41). We have reproduced for the convenience of the court two photographs, Exhibits 31 and 33, which are generally
illustrative of the scene. Exhibit 31 is a view looking
west along the highway from a point 100 feet
east of the telephone pole near which the accident
occurred. Exhibit 33 is a photograph of the same
highway looking west from a point 150 feet west
of the telephone pole where the accident occurred.
In viewing these pictures the court should keep in
mind that both automobiles in this case were traveling the opposite direction, that is east, to which
the pictures were taken. The defendant's automobile at the time of impact had come around the
distant curve shown in Exhibit 33 and had traveled
all of the highway and up to somewhere in the vicinity of the telephone pole shown in Exhibit 31 at
the time of impact. The scale diagram, Exhibit 32,
shows the width of the pavement in the area to vary
from 17.5 feet to 18 feet.
Referring to the police report, Exhibit 41,
which was introduced into the evidence, we find
that the automobile of the defendant, car No. 1,
was traveling east and the automobile driven by
Clara Faye Osborne, car No. 2, was stopped, according to the diagram prepared by the police of5
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,ficer, on the highway. The police officer's diagnosis
of the accident as shown by his investigation report, Exhibit 41, was
"Car No. 2 was standing in road, no
lights visible. Car No. 1 came around curve
and did not see car No. 2 in time to stop completely, striking two ladies standing behind
car No. 2."
The plaintiff testified that after Mrs. Osborne
had stopped they got out of the car and went up
on the sidehill and went to the bathroom (R. 115).
Mter going to the bathroom they returned to the
road, stopped and looked both ways to see if anything was coming, saw nothing and started behind
the parked car when she heard a sound and looked
up to see car lights on the sharp curve (R. 122).
Plaintiff was dressed in a light tan coat and Mrs.
Osborne had a grey fur on (R. 154). Plaintiff extended her hand and said, "Just a minute, Faye,
here comes a car." She then looked again and the
car was almost on top of them ( R. 123) . She claims
that she tried to step back but couldn't (R. 123).
When she was struck she was about one foot on the
oiled surface of the highway and about half way
behind the back end of the car (R. 161, 162). She
estimated the distance at which she first saw the
lights of the car to be 600 feet to the west and admitted that when she first saw the car approaching
at a distance of about 600 feet she could have avoid6
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ed the accident by walking a few feet to the south
(R. 153).
Francis Osborne had gone off in a different
direction from the car and did not see the actual
accident, at least not at the time of impact (R. 178).
Ralph Crane was dozing in the Osborne vehicle
at the time of the accident (R. 304). The last thing
that Mrs. Clara Faye Osborne can recall is parking
her car (R. 237). All of the plaintiff's witnesses
place the point of impact as about 30 feet west of
the telephone pole.
'The occupants of the defendant's car were
Kenneth R. Parry and the defendant Leo George
Eastman. They had met earlier in the evening at
Viv & Arch's Cafe at about 10:15 P.M. (R. 307)
where Kenneth Parry had consumed two glasses
of beer (R. 307) and the defendant had had one
glass of beer. They left Viv & Arch's about 11 :30
P.M. (R. 308) and went for a ride in Eastman's
car, ending up at the Drift Inn in Lark, Utah (R.
309). The defendant Leo George Eastman drove
the car from Viv & Arch's to Lark, Utah (R. 309).
They had another glass of beer at the Drift Inn and
then started back. The defendant had not had his
automobile very long and he and Kenneth Parry
had been discussing automobiles, what they liked
about them, etc. and when they left the Drift Inn
the defendant asked Parry if he would like to drive
7
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the car and see how it handled so that at the time
they left Lark, Utah Kenneth ' Parry was driving
the automobile (R. 309). As he drove around the
last curve prior to the point of impact he first saw
the two people standing in the road (R. 310). His
first impression that it was a cow or a horse. He
applied his brakes and thought he was going to stop
but slid into the two women. He testified that as he
came around the curve the lights were out on the
sidehill and that he could not see the women until
the lights straightened up on the highway again.
According to this witness the Osborne vehicle was
on the oiled surface of the highway in the right hand
lane going east. When he first saw the women they
were facing each other and as his car drew near
they turned around and faced him. Neither of them
made any motion to get off the highway that he
could see.
The defendant Leo George Eastman testified that
they were going around 40 miles per hour traveling
east and that as the car swerved around to where
the lights were on the highway he noticed two light
colored objects which he thought for a minute were
stock. He estimates that at that time they were
about 100 feet away and at that time the driver
Kenneth Parry applied the brakes (R. 357, 359,
360). He first realized the objects were women when
they were about 25 feet from them. At that point
8
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the women had their backs toward them, facing
east, and he did not see them make any movement
to get out of the way ( R. 359). He does not remember of having seen the Osborne car (R. 35'7). The
point of impact was about a car or two car lengths
east of the telephone pole (R. 367). The Osborne
car was knocked 20 to 25 feet by the impact. The
Osborne car was standing in the highway, the left
hand side being right on the yellow line, and facing
east. He sent Kenneth Parry to a home located
near the scene, Kaywoods, to call the police (R. 357).
He then told Mr. Osborne, "The cops or the police,
ambulance and doctor will soon be here." To which
Mr. Osborne replied, "We don't want them." (R.
358)
Kenneth Parry, Ralph Crane, Mr. Osborne and
the defendant then pushed the Osborne car off to
the north side of the road because they were afraid
another car would hit the car (R. 311). Mrs. Osborne was lying in the middle of the road about
where the yellow line would be and Mrs. Hayward
was lying a little bit south of her (R. 178). After
helping to push his car off the highway Mr. Osborne then went back and took his wife, and then
Ramona down to his car and put them in that car
(R. 179). About that time Mr. Kaywood arrived
and the two women were loaded into the Kaywood
car and Mr. Kaywood and Mr. Osborne took off
9
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with the women for the hospital (R. 358). Kenneth
Parry and the defendant remained at the scene of
the accident (R. 358) and Ralph Crane took off
for home ( R. 304). During this time Kenneth Parry .~
had observed Mr. Osborne and he testified that Mr.
Osborne had been drinking and that he was not too
steady on his feet (R. 313).
The investigating officer was Carl George, who
at that time was a deputy sheriff for Salt Lake
County ( R. 264) . He was assisted by Occie Evans,
who was in charge of the traffic department of the
Sheriff's Office (R. 328). When Deputy Sheriff·George arrived at the scene of the accident he found
Mr. Parry and the two automobiles which had been
involved in the accident. Neither Mr. Parry nor
Mr. Eastman was visibly under the influence of
alcohol at that time (R. 27 4). He found dirt and
debris on the highway at a point which he assumed
to be the point of impact, 39 feet east of the telephone pole (see the "x" on Exhibit 32). There were
two puddles of water directly west approximately
3 feet from the debris (See the circles on Exhibit
32, R. 267). There were skid n1arks coming straight
from the west to the east up to the debris and the
water (see the lines drawn on Exhibit 32, R. 267).
These marks were 72 feet in length (R. 267). The
left hand skid mark was about 3 feet 6 inches from
the center of the highway (R. 276). He was told
10
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that the Osborne car had been moved and found
it on the north side of the highway, 72 feet from
the point of impact. The Eastman car was also on
the north side of the highway, 24 feet from the point
of impact (R. 291, Exhibit 32). At one other point
in his testimony he placed the Eastman vehicle at
32 feet from the point of impact and the Osborne
vehicle at 84 feet (R. 279).
The defendant first told the investigating officer that he was driving the car ( R. 27 4). He later
told him that Parry was driving and that he had
told him he was driving because Parry did not have
a driver's license (R. 275). Mr. Eastman further
told the investigating officer that they were traveling about 40 miles per hour. They saw the danger
at 85 feet and the estimated speed at moment of
impact was 15 miles per hour.
'The officer took a statement from Kenneth
Parry (see Exhibit 41) in which Kenneth Parry
stated: "As we were coming around a bend in the
road from Lark to Herriman we suddenly saw two
women standing at the rear of an automobile in
which we a few seconds later saw there were no tail
lights on the other car." He stepped on the brakes
"But we slid into them, going very slow, turned a
a little to the left."
When the ambulance arrived Kenneth Parry
and the defendant were put in the ambulance and
11
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they drove around Lark then down to Redwood
. '
Road to West Jordan, then east into Midvale, trying
to find the Kaywood car. They finally found the
car in Midvale, whereupon the women and the defendant were taken to the hospital.
The plaintiff did produce one expert witness,
Professor Franklin S. Harris. He testified that a
car with the tail lights turned on could be seen
just as the driver came around the sharp curve at
a distance of about 600 feet (R. 246) and that there
is enough light to get some headlights on the car so
that the car without tail lights could be seen at
around 400 feet ( R. 249). He did admit, however,
that he went out there for the express purpose of
seeing what he could see and that since he was
definite'ly looking for an object he would expect
to see it sooner than a person who was not expecting
an object to be in the road (R. 249). On direct
examination he testified that a car laying down 72
feet of skid marks would be going 42 miles per
hour (R. 387). On cross examination he testified
that it would take 84 feet to stop a car going 40
miles per hour on a highway with a coefficient
friction of 65%, which is the average coefficient
friction of the average road surface and the one on
which the charts of stopping distances are generally
based (R. 391).
Upon the basis of this evidence the plaintiff
12
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seeks to show that the defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law; that the court improperly
instructed the jury and erred in either admitting
or not admitting certain testimony. We will answer
plaintiff's argument under two points, which are:
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1. THE VERDICT OF THE JURY WAS
JUSTIFIED BY THE EVIDENCE.
POINT 2. THE COURT DID NO·T ERR IN ADMITTING OR EXCLUDING CERTAIN EVIDENCE OR
IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY.

ARGUMENIT
POINT 1. THE VERDICT OF THE JURY WAS
JUSTIFIED BY THE EVIDENCE.

The defendant in this case was guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of this accident
as a matter of law only if on the basis of the evidence the jury could not reasonably have found
otherwise. In their analysis the jury were not compelled to limit their inquiry to the testimony set
out by the plaintiff, assuming for the purpose of
argument that those bits of evidence standing by
themselves would warrant a finding that defendant was negligent as a matter of law. Indeed, the
jury should consider all of the evidence. It is their
right, within certain limitations which we need not
mention here, to decide which witnesses they believe and which witnesses they do not believe, or,
13
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to say it otherwise, what evidence they consider to
be correct and what evidence they consider to be
incorrect. The trial court has no alternative but
to submit the matter to them regard1ess of how
he personally may feel when they reasonably might
arrive at a different result. The jury might well
have found from the evidence in this case that these
defendants, in full possession of their senses, there
being no evidence of excessiv~ drinking on their
part, approached the scene of the accident at a
speed of 40 miles per hour as testified to by the
defendant and that such a speed was reaonable under the conditions prevailing. The jury might further find that because of the nature of the terrain
the headlights of the defendant's automobile were
deflected off the highway until just prior to the
actual impact and that by reason of this fact the
defendant might not be able to see the women on the
highway until he was at a distance of some 100
feet from them, as claimed by him (R. 360); and
that the driver did not see the women at about that
point as physically demonstrated by the fact that
the driver was able to get the brakes on and lay
down 72 feet of skid marks prior to the actual impact. If we grant that the jury might have so found,
the authorities cited by plaintiff do not compel a
determination of this issue in her favor.
'The case of Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey, 61 Utah
14
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465, 214 Pac. 304 involved a pedestrian who was
struck while walking on State Street in Salt Lake
County, Utah. The highway there runs north and
south at the point where the collision occurred and
then on to Salt Lake City a distance of 6 or 7 miles.
In deciding that case the court quoted from Lauson
v. Fond du Lac, 141 Wis. 57, 123 N. W. 629, 25
L. R. A. (N.S.) 40, 135 Am. St. Rep. 30:
"The driver of an automobile, who, while
traveling on a dark, rainy night over a
straight stretch of strange country road,
drives his machine at such a rate of speed
that he cannot bring it to a standstill within
the distance that he can plainly see objects
or obstructions ahead of him, is not exercising ordinary care.''
In the case of Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy
Products Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 Pac. (2d) 309 we are
again concerned with a straight stretch of highway.
Said the court :
'' * * * As plaintiff approached the place
where the truck was standing on the night
in question, the highway was straight and
level for a distance of at least a mile. The
truck was directly in front of him and in his
course of travel. According to his testimony
he was keeping a constant lookout ahead. If
he was not keeping a lookout ahead, he was
guilty of negligence in failing to do so. There
was nothing to obstruct his view. It was an
ordinary c1ear, quiet summer night with no
moon. So far as appears there was nothing
15
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to divert his attention from the road in front
of him. * * * In such case it must inevitably
follow that plaintiff did not keep a lookout
ahead, or, if he did, he either did not heed
what he saw or he could not see the truck
because his lights were not such as were prescribed by law.''
When we come to the case of Nielsen v. Watanabe, 90 Utah 401, 62 Pac. (2d) 117 and introduce
the element that the driver may not have been able
to see by reason of some obstruction, a different
rule is announced. That case involved a demurrer
to a complaint wherein it was alleged that the brilliant lights from a car coming from the opposite
direction comp1etely blinded and destroyed the vision of the plaintiff and her husband and destroyed
the effects of the lights of their own car so that
they were unable to see defendant's truck parked
upon the highway. This court held that the court
below was in error in sustaining the demurrer, and
said:
" * * * In the case of Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products Co., supra, it was held
that a nonsuit was properly granted on the
grounds of contributory negligence where the
plaintiff, while driving an automobile at night
along a straight level highway without anything to obstruct his view or detract his attention, ran into a truck without a tail-light
parked on the highway. None of the cited
cases are controlling of the case in hand. The
complaint here questioned is silent as to
16
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,.

whether the highway near where the truck
was parked is straight or crooked, level or
otherwise. If the truck could not, because of
some obstruction, be seen as plaintiff and her
husband approached it prior to the time they
were blinded, and if plaintiff's husband was
driving at a lawful rate of speed an automobile properly equipped with lights and
brakes without any reason to believe the headlights of another automobile would suddenly
or unexpectedly blind him, that while so
blinded the collision occurred without time for
him to reduce his speed or stop his automobile,
the rule announced in the cases relied upon
by defendant and heretofore cited in this
opinion would not apply. Under such circumstances it may not be said that plaintiff's
husband was, as a matter of law, guilty of
contributory negligence."

The case of Hansen v. Clyde, 89 Utah 31, 56
Pac. (2d) 1366 merely held that a contractor was
not negligent in placing a barricade which was invisible due to a curve until the driver was about 50
feet away from the barricade. The court in that
case did not say whether or not the driver of the
automobile in which the plaintiff was riding was
guilty of negligence.
The case of Moss v. Christensen-Gardner, 98
Utah 253, 98 Pac.· (2d) 363 also involved a de~urrer to a complaint in which it was alleged that
the defendant erected a barricade across the highway and that because of accumulation of smoke and
17
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mist and impaired visibility by glare of headlights
the plaintiff could not see the unlighted barricade
in time to safely avoid running into the same. This
court he'ld that the complaint alleged a cause of
action and said of the rule announced in Dalley v.
Mid-Western Dairy Products

''* * * While this rule is recognized generally in other jurisdictions as well as in our
own, it is certainly not a rule without limitation or restriction."
Likewise, it was held in Trimble et ux v. Union
Pacific Stages, 105 Utah, 457, 142 Pac. (2d) 674
that where automobile in which plaintiffs' decedent
was riding had been pulled onto the highway after
sliding off the s1ippery pavement in a dense fog,
at night, and, while parked on left shoulder of highway without lights burning, the automobile was
struck by a bus, the bus driver was not negligent
as a matter of law.
The cases of Horsley v. Robinson, 112 Utah
227, 186 Pac. (2d) 592 and Shiba v. Weiss, 3 Utah
(2d) 256, 282 Pac. (2d) 341 did not involve accidents which happened at night, and merely announced the general conceded proposition of law that no
person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a greater
speed than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then and there existing. However,
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neither of these cases holds that the mere fact that
a collision occurs proves that the defendant was
traveling at a speed greater than was reasonable
and prudent. As said in Horsley v. Robinson, supra:
"The mere happening of the accident of
course does not prove that the defendants
were negligent. Nor does the fact that the
rate of speed at which they traveled brought
them at the scene of the accident at the time
that the Reinhardt car went out of control
and into the course of travel of the bus, because that is something that they could not
anticipate and guard against."
Moreover, the case of Skiba v. W eiBs, supra,
again involves a straight stretch of highway. As
said by the court in that case:
"The accident having occurred on a
stretch of highway which was straight and
level for at least a distance of about lj2 mile
west of the point where the collisions occurred
and there being no evidence of any obstructions to the view of the driver, the facts in
the instant case are very similar to those in
Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products Co.,
(supra) * * *."
A case on all fours with that before the court
at this time is Hodges v. Waite, 2 Utah ( 2d) 152,
270 Pac. (2d) 461. In that case the jury determined
from the facts in the case that the proximate cause
of the accident was occasioned by the negligence of
the defendant, by reason of the fact that he had
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stopped and parked his trucl{ and trailer upon the'
Logan-Bear River Highway below a curve in said
highway which obstructed the view of motorists
driving down the canyon, and this factor alone was
the sole proximate cause of the accident. In sustaining the verdict the court said:
."The. ~efenda!lt in this case, in support
of his position, relies on the Utah cases Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey, 61 Utah 465-~· 214 P.
304; Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products
Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P. 2d 309; and Wright v.
Maynard, Utah, 235 P. 2d 916. Mter a review of the decisions in these cases, we conclude that the law enunciated there, as a hard
and fast rule, does not apply in the instant
case. In Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products Co. the facts disclose that the defendant's truck was parked upon the highway in
the nighttime, which highway was straight,
unobscured for over a mile, there were no
curves, and no canyon highway was involved.
In Wright v. Maynard, this Court held that
the District Court committed error in directing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and
held further that it was a question for the
jury whether defendant's inability to stop his
automobile was the proximate cause of the
accident.''
"We are inclined to follow the law enunciated by this Court in the case of Trimble v.
Union Pacific Stages, 105 Utah 457, 142 P.
2d 674, and we believe the rule laid down in
said case is applicable to the situation and the
facts in the instant case. In this case this
Court said: 'Where automobile in which p1ain20
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tiffs' decedent was riding had been pulled
onto the highway after sliding off the slippe~y
pavement in a dense fog, at night, and, while
parked on left shoulder of highway without
lights burning, the automobile was struck by
a bus the bus driver was not negligent as a
matt~r of law', but a question of fact existed."
Plaintiff's argument loses ,sight of the fact that
the negligence of the defendant, should we assume
for the purpose of argument that he was negligent,
may not have been the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. In this connection the case of Wright
v. Maynard, 120 Utah 504, 235 Pac. (2d) 916 is
pertinent. In that case the appellant, at night, was
traveling between 25 and 30 miles per hour when
he rounded a slight bend in the road in the northern
outskirts of Orem. Mter he rounded this bend his
lights disclosed an unlighted car protruding in the
highway on the side he was traveling and a man in
white coveralls standing next to it waving at him.
Appellant immediately applied his brakes but on
account of the ice his car commenced sliding directly
toward the other car and the man standing by its
side, whereupon appellant swerved his car onto the
shoulder east of the highway just to the east of the
sta1led car. Just as he did this respondent jumped to
the east in front of appellant's car and was hit.
Citing the Dalley v. Midwestern Dairy Products Co.,
Horsley v. Robinson and Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey
cases, the court, in distinguishing this case, said :
21
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"In the instant case, the facts are differell:t. f\lthough appellant was not able to stop
Within the distance, he could observe substantial objects in front of him, still he saw
them in time and had sufficient control of his
car to turn aside and avoid running into them
had they remained stationary. Had respondent herein not moved from his position near
the door of the stalled car and jumped to the
east as appel1ant swerved his car to the east,
appellant would have avoided hitting him.
Under such a state of facts, the principles
enunciated in the Nikoleropoulos and Dalley
cases do not apply. Even though appellant
may have been driving too fast under existing
conditions to stop in time to avoid hitting
substantial objects disclosed by his carlights
had he kept on a straight course, still such
inability to stop w!lere he had the ability to
avoid a co1lision with those objects by some
other means, such as turning aside, presents
a different question from that decided in the
two previous cases above referred to. It was
a question for the jury to determine whether
his ina'bility to stop was the proximate cause
of the accident or whether that cause was the
unexpected change of position by plaintiff.
The court therefore erred in ruling as a matter of law that appellant's negligence was the
proximate cause of the respondent's injuries."
In the case we are now considering the evidence shows that the plai11tiff heard the defendant's
car coming, saw the lights from a distance of 600
feet away at a time when she was only about a foot
from the edge of the oil surface of the highway,
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and could have avoided the accident simply by either
remaining off the highway or by stepping off the
highway. Under these circumstances the jury may
well have found that the negligence of the defendant, if any, was not a proximate cause of the injury
to the plaintiff.
By our argument that the rule of the Dalley
v. Midwestern Dairy Products Company case does
not apply to this case, we do not mean to infer that
defendant is not subject to any restriction, for we
believe that he is still subject to the rule that no
person shall drive a vehicle on the highway at a
speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under
the conditions then and there existing, which is
in effect what the court told the jury in its Instruction 6A (R. 69). To hold that the Dalley v. Midwestern Products Company rule does apply in a case
where the view of the driver is obstructed by curves
in the road would be to utterly disregard the realities of present-day driving and to impose upon the
drivers of vehicles a standard of conduct with which
it would be impossible for them to comply. A person
driving a vehicle down a canyon at night, where the
lights would alternately be shining directly into a
canyon wall or out over the valley below, would
either have to practicarly "feel" his way around
each curve or proceed at the risk of being negligent
should he collide with another object on the highway.
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Not only can the verdict of the jury in this
case be sustained upon the theory that the defendant was not negligent or, if negligent, that his
negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident, but upon the further theory that the plaintiff's own negligence was the proximate, or at least
a proximate, cause of her own injury. The evidence
shows that she and Ralph Crane and the Osbornes
had been together all afternoon and evening, during
which time there had been considerable drinking.
And while she states that when she saw the defendan's automobile 600 feet away she was too scared
to move, the jury may have found that her senses
had been dulled and her ability impaired.to the point
where she was unable to respond to the situation.
Moreover, there is considerable evidence to the effect
that the Osborne vehicle was parked without lights
on the traveled portion of the highway and while
she did not park the vehicle she, as a reasonable
and prudent person, could not have been oblivious
to the dangerous situation which had been created
and, being conscious of the situation, may have
been guilty of contributory negligence in attempting
to cross behind said vehicle and into the left door
of the vehicle when it would have been much safer
for her to have approached the vehicle from the
right side and to have entered the vehicle through
one of the right doors.
1
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This, of course, presumes that she and Mrs.
Osborne actually left the road and went up on the
hill to go to the bathroom. The two puddles of water
would indicate that they may never have left the
highway but had gone to the bathroom behind the
Osborne vehicle, in which event the jury may have
found them guilty of negligence in placing themselves in this position of danger. In this connection we have already cited the case of Wright v.
Maynard, supra. The court's attention is also invited to Mingus v. Olsen, 114 Utah 505, 201 Pac.
(2d) 495; Reid v. Owen, 98 Utah 50, 93 Pac. (2d)
680; Cox v. Thompson, 254 Pac. (2d) 1047; and
Smith v. Bennett, 1 Utah (2d) 224, 265 Pac. (2d)
401.
Illustrative of the doctrine laid down in these
cases is Sant v. Miller, 115 Utah 559, 206 Pac. (2d)
719. In that case plaintiff and his wife were crossing the main street of Logan, Utah from east to
west at a point between intersections. They stopped
somewhere over the center line of the highway on
the west side of the street to allow south bound
traffic to pass. Plaintiff was gazing in a southwesterly direction when defendant's automdblie approaching from the north struck plaintiff and injured him. Plaintiff's wife had seen the impending
danger and stepped out of the way. A verdict was
directed in favor of the defendant by the lower court
and affirmed on appeal, the court saying:
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"Appellant was aware of the fact that
he was taking a chance in crossing the street
at a place contrary to law. He should also
have known that a driver of a vehicle would
not ordinarily anticipate the presence of
pedestrians on the street at the time and
place of the accident. Knowing that his presence might not be anticipated and knowing
that traffic on the west side of the road was
approaching from the north and with nothing
of importance to distract his attention, it was
appellant's duty to watch the traffic he knew
was approaching his location. * * * Having
omitted to continue to watch, he failed to
exercise the degree of care required of a pedestrian who leaves a place of safety and places
himself in a position of peril. A greater degree of care is necessary upon the part of a
pedestrian who undertakes to cross a city
street at a prohibited place than is placed on
one who uses a marked crosswalk. * * * "
And, finally, the jury in this case may have
concluded that the defendant Leo George Eastman
was not driving the car but that the car was driven
by Kenneth R. Parry and that he was not acting
under the control or direction of the defendant at
the time. Such was the testimony of both Kenneth
Parry (R. 309, 310) and the defendant Leo George
Eastman (R. 356).
Mere ownership of an automobile does not establish a prima facie case that the owner is liable
for damages caused by the negligence of the driver.
See Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 65, 102 Pac. (2d)
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493. The presence of the owner in a vehicle being
operated by another does raise a rebuttable presumption that the owner has control and direction
of it. This, however, is a rebuttable presumption.
See the case of Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56
Pac. (2d) 1049, 109 A. L. R. 105. As is said in
Blashfield's Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and
Practice, Volume 5, page 158:
"A man may, however, be a guest in his
own automobile, and an owner, who, although
present in his car while it is being driven by
another not his agent, is present merely as
a guest and has no control of the machine,
which is not being used in the futherance of
his business or undertaking, is not liable, in
absence of any statute imposing liability for
the negligence of such person in operating it."
The evidence in this case shows that the defendant and Kenneth Parry were not on any business
of the defendant but that Kenneth Parry had merely wanted to drive the automobile and the defendant
had permitted him to do so (R. 309). So we see that
it would have been error for the court to have instructed the jury, as contended by the plaintiff,
that the defendant was guilty of negligence as a
matter of law, for the reason that the jury might
reasonably have found under the evidence in this
case that the defendant was not even driving his
automoblie; if not driving that he was not liable
for the acts of the person who was driving; that if
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he was driving or was responsible for the actions
of the driver he was not guilty of any negligence;
and, even if he was guilty of negligence, the negligence may not have been the proximate cause of the
injury to the plaintiff, the same having been caused
by her own negligence.
POINT 2. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING OR EXCLUDING CERTAIN EVIDENCE OR
IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY.

Plaintiff complains of the actions of the court
in permitting certain _evidence, exc1uding certain
evidence and in instructing the jury in a certain
manner. We will attempt to cover those matters
in this section of our brief.
A. Admission of Evidence
The plaintiff complains that the court allowed
the witness Lyle Bates to make certain marks upon
photographs and give certain opinions about blood
spots, anti-freeze spots and skid marks which should
not have been allowed. He refers us to the Record
on pages 33'7, 339 and 350. Let us examine that
Record.
The Record shows that the witness had testified
about certain conditions which he found at the
scene of the accident and he said on page 337 that
he found two spots which he determined to be blood
stains. He was then asked to make a circle on a
photograph around the two spots which he deter28
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mined to be blood stains, when plaintiff's counsel
objected to his making circles on the picture. That
was the only objection made, the only ground given,
and the court overruled the objection and allowed
the witness to make a circle on a picture. We submit that this was not only proper but that it could
in no way prejudice the plaintiff.
On page 339 of the Record the same witness was asked if a certain picture was a picture
of the Osborne automobile (see Exhibit 37). There
was never any contention made that the automobile
in Exhibit 37 was not the automobile purported to
be shown ( R. 340) . Moreover, the court sustained
the plaintiff's objection and counsel for the defendant carried on for three pages of the Record laying
a foundation, finally identifying the automobile by
the license number on the automobile and showing
that that license number was the same as was shown
on the police report by the investigating officer.
On page 350 of the Record the same witness
was shown Exhibit 43 and asked to draw a line to
the side of the skid marks he had previously testified
about. P1aintiff's counsel objected on the ground
that it would destroy the photograph, but was over.ruled. The witness was then asked to put an outline around anti-freeze he had previously testified
about. Again plaintiff's counsel objected to making
marks on the photograph. The witness was then
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asked to put a circle around what he had previously
identified as blood stains, which was again objected
to and again overruled.
We submit that allowing the witness to so mark
the
photographs lay within the discretion of the
•
court and the plaintiff was not prejudiced in any
way by the court's allowing the exhibits to be marked. None of the objections recited were, as plaintiff
infers, to the qualification of this witness to identify
lilood spots, anti-freeze and skid marks.

B.

Evidence Excluded.

The evidence which the plaintiff claims the
court erroneously excluded was the hospital records.
Reference to the Record will show that these were
identified by the Custodian of the Hospital Records,
Hortense Wood, as the hospital records and that
Dr. Lamb, plaintiff's physician, was allowed to use
these records and testify at great length both from
the information found on the hospital records, the
x-rays and other information he may have had (R.
184 to R. 214). On page 254 of the Record plaintiff's counsel proferred all of the hospital records
as an exhibit to the case. Objection was made on
the ground that they had not been properly verified
by Dr. Lamb or anyone else, with the statement
that defendant would have no objection to those
parts of the hospital records which Dr. Lamb him30
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self signed or made out but that he had not specifically identified that part of the record. This objection was sustained on the ground that the hospital
records contained reports made by~ number of persons, such as nurses and others (R. 254) and that
the plaintiff had failed to lay a proper foundation
for their admission, not having shown that the persons who made the entries were unavailable or that
the records were made in the regular course of business of the hospital.
As was said in the case cited by defendant's
counsel in his objection (R. 254), Clayton v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 92 Utah 331, 85
Pac. (2d) 819:
"N'one of the cases there cited as supporting admissibility of hospital records go so
far as appellant would have us go in this
case. Before such records can be admitted, in
the absence of a statute, the offering party
must show the necessity of admitting the
records without requiring the person or several persons who made the records to testify.
He must then show the custody from which
the records were taken and that they were
prepared in the due course of hospital work."
C. Instructions To The Court. "
Plaintiff complains of that part of Instruction
6A wherein the court, after instructing the jury
that an operator must operate at a speed at which
he is able to stop his vehicle within the distance
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of his headlights, goes on to qualify the rule with
the statement:
"But in connection with this instruction
you must consider the evidence of the highway and the conditions, to determine whether
the lights would shine on the highway far
enough ahead for the driver to stop before
the impact in this case occurred.''
This is exactly what this court has said the
ru1e is in the cases of Hodges v. Waite and Wright
v. Maynard, supra, as we have discussed in Point
1 of our Brief. The court then goes on to say:
'"This rule of law that I have given you
does not apply on a curve but only on a section
that is sufficiently straight for a person to
stop within 350 feet which is the required
range of his headlights. If you find that in
consideration of the bends in the road, and
the conditions existing at that time, that the
driver of the defendant's automobile was driving faster than an ordinary prudent man
would have driven, then you should find the
driver negligent, and in that event, the negligence would also be a proximate cause of the
collision."
The plaintiff then questions, what does the
court mean by a curve? We think the definition of
what the court means by a curve is implicit in the
instruction itself, that is, a section of road that is
not sufficiently straight for the lights of a car to
remain on the highway and reveal objects 350 feet
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ahead. Of course, whether or not the road in the area
in which this accident happened was so curved was
a question of fact to be ascertained by the jury from
the evidence in the case and not to be decided by
the court.
What in effect the court told the jury by this
instruction is that an automobile must be equipped
with lights which will reveal persons and vehicles
at a distance of at least 350 feet, and that he must
so drive and so control his automobile as to be able
to stop within that distance, except in situations
such as where there is a curve on the highway where
the lights could not shine upon the road for a distance of 350 feet, but that in those instances the
driver is still required to exercise ordinary and
reasonable care. We submit this is a correct statement of the law.
Plaintiff complains of Instructions No. 12, 13,
and 14 (R. 79, 79B and 80) and states that these
instructions over-emphasize drinking and intoxication as to the plaintiff.
In Instruction No. 12, which is a long instruction and has to do with the plaintiff's failure to
move out of the pathway of the oncoming automobile, the jury is instructed that they may consider
a number of things in determining whether an ordinary prudent person would have stepped aside.
The instruction is quite long and detailed and only
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one phase of that instruction deals with intoxication, when the jury is told that one of the things
they may consider is plaintiff's condition of sobriety'.
By Instruction No. 13 the jury were told that
if they found from the evidence that the plaintiff
was under the influence of alcohol to the extent
that she failed to appreciate the danger or to make
a reasonable effort to avoid a co1lision, the plaintiff was negligent. This is similar to Instruction No.
6d, in which the jury were told that if the defendant's ability to drive was impaired as a result of
the use of intoxicating liquor this was negligence.
Of course, Instruction No. 14 merely defined
intoxication and_ applies equally to the plaintiff and
the defendant.
Both the plaintiff and the defendant had a
right to have the theory of his case or defense presented to the jury, and that is all that the court has
done in this instance. To have done less would have
been error.
By its Instruction No. 6e, of which plaintiff
a1so complains, the jury was instructed:
"There is evidence in the case that Kenneth R. Parry did not have an operator's license. Even though you might find Kenneth
R. Pa·rry was the driver of said automobile,
you are not to consider this lack of a license
as the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries."
What this instruction has to do with the fact
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that the plaintiff had been drinking all night, as
argued by the plaintiff, is not apparent. It does
withdraw from the jury the question of whether
or not his having a license to drive and whether or
not the fact that his license had been revoked by
reason of drunken driving was a proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injuries, and does eliminate them
from the jury's deliberation in arriving at liability
in this case. This, however, is good law. The fact
that Kenneth R. Parry did not have a driver's license, or the fact that his license had been revoked
was not, and cou1d not under the circumstances
of this case have been, the proximate cause of this
accident.
Plaintiff then complains of Instruction No. 9
(R. 76), which instruction merely outlines what
the jury must find in order to return a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff and, of course, tells them
they must find defendant negligent, and in doing
so uses general language, to-wit:
That he was
negligent (a) in that said driver was driving too
fast for existing conditions; (b) that said driver
was not keeping a proper lookout; (c) that said
driver was operating a car while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor.
The question of whether or not the driver was
driving too fast for existing conditions and whether
or not the driver was keeping a proper lookout go
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to the point of whether or not the defendant was
over-driving his lights, which issue plaintiff claims
was not covered. If by her criticism the plaintiff
means that defendant's lights were faulty, we find
that no such issue was involved in the case. See the
court's pre-trial order on page 13 of the record in
which the plaintiff's contentions are set out. There
are six contentions of negligence, but none of these
says anything about the defendant's automobile having been equipped with faulty lights, nor is there
any evidence whatever in the record that the defendant's lights were faulty. If this is what was
intended by the plaintiff, to have given such an instruction would have been error.
Instruction No. 11, which is criticized by the
plaintiff as being a duplication of Instruction No. 12,
defines the plaintiff's duty to keep a reasonable lookout for automobiles using the highway and to continue to look and observe the automobile as it approached her. Whereas Instruction No. 12 is addressed to a different point, that is her duty to
move back from the path of danger if an ordinary
prudent person would have stepped aside under
similar circumstances.
For this reason both instructione were necessary and in view of the fact that it is admitted that
the plaintiff did actually see defendant's automobile
neither instruction is prejudicial.
3'6
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Instruction No. 15 did not tell the jury that
they might not consider the bias and prejudice, if
any, of Lyle Bates in determining what credibility
to give to his testimony, which is what plaintiff
would infer. It merely told the jury it was entirely
immaterial whether the defendant or either party
carried insurance protecting such persons against
loss or liability and that the jury were to disregard
any reference to insurance and in no wise speculate
or consider the existence or non-existence of insurance in arriving at their verdict. There is nothing
whatever said in the instruction as to what weight
is to be given to Lyle Bates' testimony.
Plaintiff cites a number of cases in her argument to the effect that the court should not give inconsistent instructions; that the instructions should
be applicable to the evidence and the respective
theories of the case; and that they should not accentuate the duty of one person and minimize the
duty of the other, or vice versa. However, we submit
that the instructions given in this case do not violate
any of these principles. We submit that an analysis
of all the instructions as a whole will show that they
adequately define both parties' theories; that they
were not inconsistent and were sufficiently detailed
as to apply to the evidence in the case. Reviewing
the instructions only generally:
Instruction No. 1 merely outlines the
contentions of both parties.
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Instruction No. 2 has to do with the burden of proof.
Instruction No. 3 is a "stock" instruction defining what is meant by the burden of
proof.
Instruction No. 4 contains "stock" definitions of the term "negligence" and the like.
Instruction No. 5 merely lays down the
test for negligence.
Instruction No. 6 directs the jury that
they should first decide whether the driver
of the defendant's automobile vvas negligent
and, if so, whether the negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
Instruction No. 6a we have already discussed and has to do with the duty of an individual to drive his car within the range
of his headlights on a straight road.
Instruction No. 6b has to do with whether or not the defendant was driving too fast.
Instruction No. 6c has to do with the
defendant's ability to avoid the accident.
Instruction No. 6d has to do with whether or not the defendant was driving under
the influence of intoxicating liquor.
Instruction No. 6e tells the jury that
they cannot find that the fact that Kenneth
R. Parry did not have a driver's license was
a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.
Instruction No. 6f has to do with the
question of agency between Kenneth R. Parry
and the defendant.
3R
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Instruction No. 7 further amplifies this
question of agency.
Instruction No. 8 tells the jury they
should not allow sympathy to influence their
verdict.
Instructions No. 9 and 9a define the issues between the parties.
Instruction No. 10 defines "contributory negligence".
Instruction No. 11 defines the plaintiff's duty to maintain a lookout for automibiles on the highway.
Instruction No. 12 has to do with the
~u~y of the plaintiff to step back and avoid
InJury.
Instruction No. 12a is merely a statement of the rule that a driver who is faced
with a sudden emergency cannot be expected
to exercise the same care as if he had time
for cool and deliberate deliberation.
Instructions No. 13 and 14 deal with
intoxication.
Instruction No. 15 tells the jury they
may not take into consideration whether
either of the parties is protected by insurance.
Instruction No. 16 has to do with damages.
Instruction No. 17 is a "stock" instruction on damages.
Instruction No. 17a tells the jury that
Mrs. Osborne is not a party to the lawsuit.
Instruction No. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
25, 26 and 27 are "stock" instructions.
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You will note from this admitted1y brief resume that the instructions are not inconsistent, do
not over-emphasize the plaintiff's duties and adequately present the theory of the plaintiff's case.
CONCLUSION
As we said at the outset, there are really only
two questions to be resolved in this appeal. Might
the jury have found as they did under the evidence;
and were the issues properly submitted to them?
Both of these questions must be answered in the
affirmative. The evidence did not show negligence
on the part of the defendant as a matter of law.
The jury might well have found that the defendant
was not negligent, in fact, might have found that
he was not even driving his vehicle and that he was
not responsible for the negligence of the person who
was. Plaintiff attempts to bring this case within
the rule announced in Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy
Products Company supra, that a person must drive
his car so as to be able to stop within the range
which his headlights will or ought to reveal objects
or persons upon the highway. We find that that is
not the rule to be applied in this case, but rather the
law enunciated by Hodges v. Waite, supra, and
Wright v. Maynard, supra, to the effect that this
rule does not apply when conditions of the highway
are such that the lights are precluded from shining
on the highway, as in the case of fog, or are diverted
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from the highway, as is the case of curves.
The jury might well have further found that
the proximate cause of this accident was the failure
of the plaintiff to remove herself from a position of
danger after having observed the defendant's automobile, either by reason of a disregard for her own
safety or because her physical ability to respond
to the situation had been impaired by the drinking
she had admittedly done during the evening.
Nor does the record show that any evidence
which should have been admitted or evidence which
should have been excluded was either wrongfully
admitted or excluded to the plaintiff's prejudice.
It is most always easy to take instructions bit
by bit or excerpt by excerpt and convincingly argue
that they were either erroneous or prejudicial. However, when we consider the instructions as a whole
in this case we find that the jury was adequately
and properly instructed on all of the issues in the
case and the plaintiff's theory; that the instructions
were not slanted in the defendant's favor; and that
there is no error in the instructions which was prejudicial to the plaintiff's rights.
We, therefore, respectfully submit that the result reached in this case should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted
EDWIN B. CANNON
DON J. HANSON
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